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FROM WAURN PONDS: REGISTRATION OF TITLE OR TITLE BY 
REGISTRATION?1
Prophitius v Campbell 2008 3 SA 552 (D&cLD)
1 This decision dealt with a so-called double sale of land by a fraudulent owner 
that culminated in a prior-in-time registration in the deeds office in favour of the 
second purchaser and subsequent registration in favour of the first purchaser. Both 
purchasers were unaware of the fraud perpetrated by the seller and obtained title 
deeds to the same property. The court granted priority to the first registered owner 
on the strength of the prior in tempore potior in iure maxim to the exclusion of the 
second registered owner. This decision will be discussed with reference to the op-
eration of the equivalent priority rule in Australia and more specifically the state of 
Victoria. The classification of the South African land registration system is briefly 
revisited and compared with the classification of the Torrens system as a system of 
title by registration. This feature or classification of the Torrens system seems novel 
to South African law.
2 In terms of a written agreement of sale, the registered owner, the campbell chil-
dren’s Trust (the “trust”) sold immovable property (erf 757, Palm beach) to the third 
respondent on 22 January 2004. Ten months later, on 30 October 2004, the trust, 
also in terms of a written agreement of sale, sold the same property to the applicants. 
On 26 December 2004 the third respondent (as seller) sold the property in terms 
of a written agreement of sale to the fourth respondent (as purchaser). Transfer of 
the land from the trust to the applicants was registered in the deeds registry on 15 
February 2005. The registrar of deeds registered the transfer of the same property 
simultaneously from the trust to the third respondent and from the third respondent 
to the fourth respondent on 5 May 2005. both the applicants on the one hand and 
the fourth respondent on the other hand claimed to be the rightful owner of the same 
property. both were in possession of title deeds to the same property. The registrar 
of deeds informed both parties that the registrar could not make a determination as 
to who the rightful owner of the property was and requested the parties to approach 
the court for a declaratory order. The applicants accordingly applied in the Durban 
and coast local division for an order declaring them to be the rightful owners of 
the property and for the records of the deeds registry to be amended accordingly. 
The fourth respondent launched a counter application for an order declaring him to 
be the rightful owner of the property and for the record of the deeds registry to be 
amended accordingly (see 552c-G; 554G-556e).
3 The court found that the trust had committed a fraud by selling the property to 
both the applicants and the third respondent which in turn sold it to the fourth re-
spondent (556F). The court also accepted that the applicants and fourth respondent 
were innocent parties (556h and 558I).
4 The court adhered to the abstract system of transfer of ownership (see 557A-
I). This means that the invalidity of the preceding obligationary agreement (ie the 
underlying contract) does not affect the validity of the transfer of ownership. Own-
ership can be transferred in spite of the invalidity of the obligationary agreement 
if there was a valid real agreement to transfer and receive ownership coupled with 
registration (Van der Walt and Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property (2007) 
1 I wish to acknowledge the comments and suggestions of Prof hanri Mostert of ucT and claire 
Macken of Deakin university.
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126-127) and compliance with the other general requirements for transfer of owner-
ship (Sonnekus Ongegronde Verryking in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (2007) 22; and cf 
Van der Merwe “Things” XXVII LAWSA re par 362). conversely, three juristic acts 
are involved in the passing of ownership of land, namely the obligationary agree-
ment directed at creating an obligation to transfer, the real agreement between the 
parties to transfer and to receive ownership and the actual transfer of the property 
by registration (Van der Merwe par 366).
The court held that the abstract system of transfer of ownership was applicable to 
movables and immovables (558G). One can perhaps now accept as settled law that 
the abstract system of transfer also applies to immovables. In early South African 
property law it was accepted that transfer of immovable property by means of for-
gery or fraud would make the transfer void (Maasdorp and hall II Maasdorp’s In-
stitutes of South African Law: The Law of Things (1948) 84). The court rejected the 
argument that the fraud of the trust vitiated both the underlying causa and the pass-
ing of ownership in terms of the real agreement (558F). The court accepted the view 
of Van der Merwe (par 364) that such argument is repugnant to the abstract system 
of transfer (558G). The court, however, indicated that the outcome of its decision 
would have been completely different had there been proof of knowledge by either 
the applicants or the third and fourth respondents of the fraud perpetrated by the 
trust (558I). by implication, such different outcome is not achieved if the purchaser 
is an innocent transferee (see 558I-559b). Nicholson J accordingly decided:
“The public system of deeds registration is a notice to the world of the ownership of immovable 
property and this would take no consideration for the underlying causa of the transaction. The fact 
that the applicants obtained transfer first means that they became the real owners by delivery [sic] 
of the immovable property. This is in accordance with the principle qui prior est tempore potior est 
jure” (558G-h).
The court, however, expressed its considerable sympathy for the fourth respond-
ent who had only the solace of an action for damages against the first and second 
respondents (559b-c).
5 Generally, a distinction is made between systems of “registration of deeds” 
and “registration of title”. Registration of deeds refers to a system whereby deeds 
are recorded at their face value, often without proper examination, and sometimes 
without being linked to a proper cadastral system. Priority is simply conferred on 
registered deeds over unregistered deeds and subsequently registered deeds (baden-
horst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (2003) 
229-230). Registration of title, on the other hand, refers to the maintenance of a 
necessarily authoritative record of the rights regarding clearly defined units of land 
existing at a particular point in time. It characteristically features security, simplic-
ity, accuracy, expedition, and completeness of record. however, the distinction is 
not always clear-cut and simple (badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert 229-230).
The South African registration system is a peculiar brand of deeds registration. It 
is normally characterised by its high levels of accuracy and efficiency, which main-
tain security of title. Section 3(1)(b) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 affords 
the registrar an active role in examining and approving or rejecting deeds. Neverthe-
less, the South African Deeds Register is not guaranteed to be correct or complete 
under all circumstances, and mistakes can occur. This is illustrated by cases such 
as Barclays Nasionale Bank Bpk v Registrateur van Aktes, Transvaal (1975 4 SA 
936 (T)) and Standard Bank van SA Bpk v Breitenbach (1977 1 SA 151 (T)). These 
cases illustrate that mistakes and even fraud occur. Moreover, real rights in land 
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can be acquired in ways other than through transfer by registration (for example by 
prescription), and real rights in land may also be lost (for example by abandonment). 
Section 99 of the Deeds Registries Act exempts the deeds registry officials from 
liability in respect of non-negligent acts. Implicit in this provision is the awareness 
that there may be loss arising from an error or omission in registration. however, 
any form of warranty of the position as portrayed in the registered deed would be 
incompatible with the fundamental requirements that the transferor must be in a po-
sition to pass ownership and the parties must intend to transfer and receive transfer 
(Mngadi v Ntuli 1981 3 SA 478 (D); Mvusi v Mvusi 1995 4 SA 994 (Tk)). This begs 
the question whether third parties who rely in good faith on the correctness of incor-
rect data or on incomplete data in the deeds registry are protected at the expense of 
the original holders of the real rights concerned. based on the outcomes of both Bar-
clays Nasionale Bank Bpk v Registrateur van Aktes, Transvaal and Standard Bank 
van SA Bpk v Breitenbach it is assumed that third parties who rely in good faith on 
incorrect or incomplete data in the deeds registry are not protected at the expense of 
the original holders of the real rights concerned (badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert 
235). South African law thus does not expressly guarantee the indefeasibility of a 
registered deed (carey Miller and Pope Land Title in South Africa (2000) 53). The 
South African land register generally proves ownership, but this is not necessarily 
conclusive (Knysna Hotel CC v Coetzee NO 1998 2 SA 743 (A) 753c).
Despite the fact that the registration system is one of deeds, transport documents 
are thoroughly checked by the deeds office. Registration only takes place if all docu-
ments are correct and do meet the requirements set by the Deeds Registries Act. The 
information contained in a deed must coincide with the cadastral information and 
linking of documents takes place. A statutory duty is imposed on the registrar of 
deeds to ensure that the registers are complete and correct (Van der Walt and Pien-
aar 137). These features again point towards a system of registration of title. As will 
be seen in paragraph 6 below, indefeasibility of title, the most important feature of 
the Torrens system of land registration, is not absolute but subject to various excep-
tions to the rule.
In Ex parte Menzies et Uxor (1993 3 SA 799 (c) 805-806) it was remarked that 
registration serves the purpose of an act of delivery where this is required in respect 
of the transfer of ownership in immovable property, while both in this situation and 
in the cases in which ownership vests in immovables without an act of delivery, reg-
istration serves the purpose of providing a public record of real rights in land.
The maxim prior in tempore potior in iure is generally said to be applicable 
where there is a conflict between two or more real rights (Van der Merwe par 234). 
The maxim is usually applied if more than one mortgage bond is registered over 
land. The later mortgagee acquires a real right of security in the property, subject to 
the real right of the prior mortgagee (Scott “Mortgage and pledge” XVII.2 LAWSA 
(2008) par 372). Upon closer analysis the maxim can be seen to apply to a conflict 
between two rights of real security, namely mortgage bonds, but these rights differ 
in content, albeit in a very small way. The extent or scope of entitlements by virtue 
of the respective rights of the bondholders is determined by ranking of their respec-
tive bonds. In the Prophitius case the competing real rights were identical, namely 
ownership. It is submitted that the above-mentioned dictum of Nicholson J (see par 
4 above) can rather be justified with reliance on the maxim nemo plus iuris ad alium 
transferre potest quam ipse haberet (or the maxim nemo dat quod non habet) than 
the maxim prior in tempore. In short, the trust could not have transferred ownership 
to the so-called “second registered owner”, because ownership as a real right had 
previously been transferred to the first registered owner. Because no ownership (or 
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other real right) could be transferred by the trust to the “second registered owner”, 
two conflicting real rights did not exist. In others words, the operation of the nemo 
plus iuris rule in the case of a prima facie competing right of ownership (which was 
really not the case) makes it unnecessary to rely on the prior in tempore principle.
6 A dispute like the one outlined above is referred to in Australian land law as a 
priority dispute. A priority dispute arises where two or more persons have incon-
sistent proprietary interest in the same piece of land (bradbrook, Maccullum and 
Moore Australian Real Property Law (2007) 75).
A contract of sale of an interest in land must be in writing and signed by the party 
against whom it will be enforced (s 126 of the Instruments Act 1958 (Vic)). Once a 
contract has been entered into for the disposition of land, it gives the purchaser an 
equitable interest in land. To the extent that the purchaser has a beneficial interest 
in the property prior to conveyance, the vendor is regarded as holding the property 
on a constructive trust for the purchaser (Tan, Webb and Wright Land Law (2002) 
72-73).
There are three categories of land in Australia, namely “old title land” (or “gen-
eral law land”), “Torrens title land” and “crown land” (butt Land Law (2006) 669). 
(“crown land” falls beyond the scope of this discussion and will not be referred to 
further.) “Old title land” is land which was issued by the crown prior to the com-
mencement of the first Torrens legislation in Victoria, namely the Transfer of Land 
Act 1862, and land which remains unconverted to the Torrens system. “Torrens 
title land” is: (a) land alienated or granted by the crown after the introduction of the 
Torrens system in 1862; and (b) land converted from “old title land” to the Torrens 
system (hepburn Principles of Property Law (2006) 239; bradbrook, Maccullum 
and Moore 109). The Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) governs old title land whereas 
the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) is the current Torrens statute. As a general rule, 
all conveyances or disposition of a legal interest in land must be by deed (s 52(1) of 
the Property Law Act 1958 (Vic); s 40(2) of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic)). In 
Victoria, since 1998 it has no longer been possible to register deeds, conveyances 
or written instruments in the office of the registrar-general under the Property Law 
Act (s 6(2) of the Property Law Act). If a person wishes to register an instrument 
relating to old title land, it must be brought within the Torrens system (hepburn 
223). The aim of the closure of the register is to provide an impetus for the conver-
sion of the remaining general law land to Torrens land (bradbrook, Maccullum and 
Moore 109). A deeds registration system operates in respect of general law land, 
whereas a Torrens system of land registration operates in respect of Torrens title 
land (hepburn 223).
The deeds registration system was a system for registering documents and is 
subject to the frailties of those documents (chambers An Introduction to Property 
Law in Australia (2008) 433) and has never provided a guarantee of title (Gray, 
edgeworth, Foster and Grattan Property Law in New South Wales (2007) 275). The 
Torrens system is a system for registering property rights, not documents (cham-
bers 434). The main feature of the Torrens system is that it is not so much a system 
of registration of title, but a system of title by registration (Gray et al 288). The 
Torrens system is based upon the notion of an independent title whereby upon each 
conveyance the land would be surrendered to the crown which would then re-grant 
it to the purchaser (hepburn Australian Property Law Cases, Materials and Analy-
sis (2008) 554). This system provides a title which is not merely created by private 
arrangement between parties but also guaranteed by the state (Gray et al 288). This 
goes to the heart of the Torrens system. Viewed from a South African law perspec-
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tive, an interesting form of original acquisition of ownership prima facie takes place 
because the new title created by registration is not subject to the infirmities of title 
of a predecessor in title. As will be seen in section 6 below, indefeasibility of title is, 
however, not absolute but subject to various exceptions to the rule.
Tooher and Dwyer (Introduction to Property Law (2008) 85) note that the closure 
of the deeds register in Victoria does not affect deeds that have already been regis-
tered. They maintain that the provisions of the property law remain of continuing 
significance: first, a fairly substantial area of land in Victoria is still regulated by 
the old system of deed registration. According to the registrar-general, in 1998 some 
30 000 parcels of land remained within the ambit of the system. Second, when an 
application is made to bring general law land within the operation of the Torrens 
system, priorities between the conflicting interests are judged according to the rules 
of the old system. Third, even with converted land the provision of the Property Law 
Act will still affect priorities (85-86).
Proprietary estates or interests in land are divided according to whether they 
come under the Torrens system or not. “Old title interests” (or “general law land 
interests”) can be divided between legal interests and equitable interests. Old title 
interests and priority disputes are governed by fundamental common law and eq-
uitable rules which have been developed specifically to deal with priority disputes 
which may arise between these interests and the statutory scheme of registration 
under the DRS XXX (Gray et al 261; hepburn (2006) 175). “Torrens title land inter-
ests” can be distinguished between registered interests and unregistered interests. 
These interests are governed by express provisions of the Torrens statute (hepburn 
(2006) 175 and 241). If only unregistered interests are involved in a dispute the gen-
eral priority rules governing conflicts between equitable interests under the general 
law find application (Bradbrook, MacCullum and Moore 179).
under the rules of law and equity the date of execution of the document pursu-
ant to which the interest was created is important for purposes of priority analysis. 
conveyance of legal estates or interests in general law land takes place by the execu-
tion of a deed (s 52(1) of the Property Law Act 1958). execution of a deed requires 
it to be signed by the parties, attested by witnesses, sealed and delivered before it 
becomes effective (s 73(1) and 159 of the Property Law Act; hepburn 181). A deed 
expressed to be sealed is deemed to be sealed and does not need to be sealed (s 73A 
of the Property Act).
Registration under the deeds registration system was not compulsory. however, 
if a deed was registered, in terms of section 6(1) of the Property Law Act it imme-
diately gained priority over an unregistered (registrable) interest or a subsequently 
registered interest, provided the former deed was executed bona fide and for valuable 
consideration (hepburn (2006) 225; Gray et al 261). The deeds registration system, 
thus, altered the traditional general law priority principles because it determines 
that priority depends upon the date when the interest is registered and not when it 
was created (hepburn (2006) 223-224, 229). Granting priority was an incentive to 
induce parties to register instruments (Gray et al 275).
under the rules of the common law and equity a dispute between the holders of 
two legal estates is resolved by determining when the interests were created (which 
is generally the date of execution of the document) and according priority to the in-
terest which was created first in time (Bradbrook, MacCullum and Moore 77). This 
is in line with the central role which the prior in tempore rule plays in priority dis-
putes in common law and equity. For instance, Tooher and Dwyer in their attempt 
to simplify the priority rules state: “as between interests of the same general nature, 
for example two conflicting legal interests in land, or two conflicting equitable in-
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terests, the principle is that the interests rank according to the date of their creation, 
so that priority in time leads to priority as a matter of law” (77). Thus, for instance if 
A had conveyed the legal fee simple to b and A subsequently had purported to con-
vey the legal fee simple to C, B’s interest, being first in time, would prevail. It may, 
however, be argued that this example of two identical estates is simply an applica-
tion of the maxim nemo dat quod not habet, and that it is not a case of conflicting 
interests (bradbrook, Maccullum and Moore 77). The application of the nemo dat 
quod non habet principle rather prevents any priority dispute between two identical 
estates from arising, because a grantor who has already transferred his legal estate 
to the grantee cannot transfer the same estate again (hepburn (2006) 186).
Ownership of a parcel of land under Torrens legislation is recorded on a sepa-
rate certificate and folio kept at a central registry in the capital city of each state 
(Tooher and Dwyer 93; see s 27(7) and 27b of the Transfer of Land Act 1958). The 
certificate of title must be produced to the registrar before a dealing with the land 
is registered (bradbrook, Maccullum and Moore 126). conveyance of title occurs 
through the registration of a properly executed transfer form upon the relevant fo-
lio rather than the execution of a deed of conveyance, so that the name of the new 
proprietor is entered on the folio (hepburn (2006) 238; Tooher and Dwyer 92). A 
registered document under the Torrens system is deemed to be a deed (s 40(2) of the 
Transfer of Land Act (Vic)). Registration not only confers title but also determines 
priority of registered interests (butt 725). Disputes between a holder of a registered 
interest and holders of registered or unregistered interests are resolved by the ap-
plication of the so-called paramountcy provisions, which confers indefeasibility of 
title and identification of possible exceptions to indefeasibility. “Indefeasibility of 
title” means that a registered holder acquires a conclusive title subject to the interest 
registered on that title and the established and non-statutory exceptions (hepburn 
(2008) 558). Thus, the title cannot be set aside on the ground of a defect existing 
in the title before the interest was registered (butt 725). Indefeasibility of title is 
conferred upon registration by section 42(1) of the Transfer of Land Act 1958. This 
entails that once an estate is registered, the registered proprietor will have priority 
over the land despite the existence of other interests, and the registered proprietor of 
an estate will only be subject to those encumbrances actually noted on the register 
(see hepburn (2006) 245).
The indefeasibility or priority of the registered proprietor’s title is, however, sub-
ject to the following exceptions contained in the Transfer of Land Act:
(a)  a person who acquires a registered interest by committing “actual fraud” will 
be liable to have his title rectified by the registrar (s 42(1); Hepburn (2006) 
252);
(b)  the title of a registered proprietor will not be valid against the interest or estate 
of a registered proprietor claiming the same land under a prior folio or certifi-
cate of title (s 42(1)(a); hepburn (2006) 257);
(c)  the title of the registered proprietor will not be valid in respect of any portion 
of land which may have been included in the certificate of title due to the in-
correct description of the land or its boundaries (s 42(1)(b); hepburn (2006) 
257);
(d)  the reservations, exceptions, conditions and powers (if any) contained in the 
crown grant of the land (s 42(2)(a));
(e)  any rights subsisting under any adverse possession of the land (s 42(2)(b));
(f)  any public rights of way (s 42(2)(c));
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(g)  any easements howsoever acquired subsisting over, upon or affecting the land 
(s 42(2)(d));
(h)  the interest of a tenant in possession of the land (s 42(2)(e)); and
(i)  any unpaid land tax rates and other charges (s 42(2)(f).
The first exception is referred to in the Torrens system as the fraud exception. (As 
to the meaning of “actual fraud” in this context, see bradbrook, Maccullum Moore 
146-155; hepburn (2006) 252-254.) Knowledge of an unregistered interest in land 
is not imputed as fraud due to the abolition of the doctrine of notice by the Torrens 
system (s 43 of the Transfer of Land Act). The second exception is referred to in the 
Torrens system as the prior folio or certificate of title exception. The interests classi-
fied under the exceptions (d)-(i) stated above are described as the “paramount inter-
ests”. All registered interests are subject to the paramount interests (hepburn (2006) 
245). The interests of a tenant in possession of land under exception (h) above do 
not include an option to purchase (s 42(2)(e)). Just like prescription in South Africa, 
its equivalent adverse possession is specifically protected by section 42(2)(b) of the 
Transfer of Land Act and will constitute an exception to any subsequent registration. 
Thus, a subsequent registered proprietor will take possession subject to any posses-
sory rights that an adverse possessor may have accrued (hepburn (2008) 192).
The indefeasibility of the registered proprietor’s title is also subject to other ex-
ceptions which arise outside the Torrens statutes. These exceptions, such as the in 
personam exception, inconsistent legislation and volunteers (persons acquiring title 
without consideration), however, fall beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
(See further bradbrook, Maccullum and Moore 160 et seq; hepburn (2006) 261 et 
seq.)
Registration under the Torrens system is not mandatory. however, unregistered 
titles cannot take advantage of the indefeasibility provisions (hepburn (2008) 555). 
Priority disputes between holders of unregistered interests are decided by applica-
tion of the general priority rules governing conflicts between equitable interests 
under the general law (bradbrook, Maccullum and Moore 179).
7 The application of the priority rules to the facts of the Prophitius decision will 
be used to show the operation of the different rules.
7.1 Assuming for argument’s sake that the ownership in the Prophitius decision 
were “legal estates” in general law land created upon execution of the deeds, under 
the rules of the common law the deed first executed in time would prevail.
As seen before, the deeds registration system has altered this general priority 
principle. A registered deed has priority over an unregistered interest or subse-
quently registered interest provided the former deed is executed bona fide and for 
valuable consideration (s 6(1) of the Property Law Act). Priority is granted to the 
registered owner over the unregistered owner or the owner who subsequently reg-
istered the interest. Just as in the Prophitius decision, priority will be gained by 
the person who registered first in time despite the fact that the “losing” party may 
have executed his deed earlier in time, provided that the transferee was bona fide 
and provided consideration (which was the case). In the Prophitius case, the party 
to the first contract of sale from the trust did not register transfer of ownership first 
and priority was accorded to the party to the second contract of sale from the trust 
who first registered transfer of ownership. Subsequent registration of the party to 
the first contract of sale will not change the operation of the prior in tempore rule. 
If a registered proprietor in a Prophitius scenario acquired title by fraud (which the 
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court found was not the case in Prophitius), bona fides would be absent and priority 
will not be granted to the fraudster.
7.2 The first registered owner in the Prophitius case would in terms of the Torrens 
system have acquired indefeasible title subject to the above-mentioned exceptions to 
indefeasibility of title (see par 6 above). The second registered owner in the Prophi-
tius case would, however, not be able to acquire indefeasible title upon registration 
to the exclusion of the first registered owner because it is not permitted by section 
42(1)(a), which states that title of the registered proprietor is subject to the estate or 
interest of a proprietor claiming the same land under a prior folio of the register. 
Thus, in the situation where two folios or certificates of title are issued in respect of 
the same land and even if the registered proprietor under the second certificate is a 
bona fide purchaser for value, the interest of the registered proprietor under the prior 
certificate prevails (Bradbrook, MacCullum and Moore 155). In priority-speak, the 
“paramountcy provision” protecting the first registered proprietor has priority over 
the “indefeasibility provision” of the second registered proprietor (see bradbrook, 
MacCullum and Moore 155-156). This prior folio or certificate of title exception in 
section 42(1)(a) only applies where there are two folios or certificates in existence at 
the same time (bradbrook, Maccullum and Moore 156). In other words, the same 
result as achieved by the court in the Prophitius case by relying on the prior in 
tempore rule would be achieved under the Torrens system by application of section 
42(1)(a) of the Transfer of Land Act. upon compliance with the statutory require-
ments, any person like the second registered owner in the Prophitius case sustaining 
loss or damage by reason of the registration of any other person as proprietor is enti-
tled to be indemnified by the statutory “assurance fund” (s 110(1)(c) of the Transfer 
of Land Act 1958). In Victoria claims are paid out of consolidated revenue.
If a registered proprietor in a Prophitius scenario acquired title by fraud (which 
the court found was not the case in Prophitius), indefeasibility of title would not 
have been obtained due to the fraud exception recognised in the Torrens system. In 
terms of this exception the title of a person who acquired a title by committing “ac-
tual fraud” will be rectified by the registrar – ie the title will no longer be valid.
8 As stated before, mistakes do occur in the South African deeds register. More 
recently, on 8 December 2007 the Pretoria deeds office electronic server experi-
enced an unprecedented loss of thousands of images of title deeds and documents 
scanned between 25 August and 8 December 2007 as a result of unstable power 
supply (Registrar’s Circular 1 of 2008 (Pretoria) par 1). Conveyancers, financial 
institutions, local authorities, the provincial government and the general public who 
were in possession of paper copies of title deeds and documents were requested to 
re-submit these to the registrar of deeds for the purpose of rescanning (par 2).
Whether Australian style priority rules (as applicable to their deeds registration 
system) or some form of compensation for losses caused by the operation of the sys-
tem of registration by the state or private title insurance, like in parts of the united 
States, may become necessary in future or provide solutions, is too speculative at 
this stage to warrant any further discussion.
9 Registration in South Africa is one of the three juristic acts involved in the 
passing of ownership of immovables. As maintained before, South Africa has its 
peculiar brand of deeds registration leaning towards a system of registration of title. 
Assuming it to be more than a deed registration system, it is not like the Torrens 
system a system of title by registration insofar as the birth of a new title guaranteed 
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and safeguarded by the state does not take place upon registration of transfer of an 
estate (or ownership) in land.
The outcome achieved in the Prophitius decision would be the same in Australian 
law under a dispensation of old title land and Torrens land. The result of the Prophi-
tius decision was strictly speaking achieved by the application of the nemo plus iuris 
rule rather than the prior in tempore rule. upon application of the nemo plus iuris 
rule to perceived identical real rights reliance on the prior in tempore rule became 
superfluous. The prior in tempore rule should be applied as a priority rule if persons 
have inconsistent real rights in land which are both in existence.
It is submitted that provisions similar to the Victorian prior folio or certificate of 
title exception and the fraud exception (in the case of fraud committed by the trans-
feree) should be introduced in the Deeds Registries Act to resolve problems created 
by double sales, either with or without fraud on the part of the registered transferee. 
The same result as the Prophitius decision (and even beyond in the case of fraud by 
the transferee) could be achieved without the necessity of litigation by users of the 
deeds registry system. The mere existence of exceptions to indefeasibility, such as 
the prior folio or certificate of title exception and the fraud exception in the Torrens 
system, which is universally highly regarded for its accuracy and effectiveness, pro-
vides food for some thought.
PJ bADeNhORST
Deakin University
THE SUM INSURED AND VALUED INSURANCE POLICIES: 
THE APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES
Homeplus Investments (Pvt) Ltd v Kantharia Insurance Brokers (Pvt) Ltd case no 
hh 15-2008 (hc Zim) (unreported 5-03-2008)
1  Introduction
Is it not surprising how often there is little pertinent judicial authority on and ex-
planation of what may be considered fundamental legal tenets? Perhaps this is so 
because litigation tends to concern the exceptional cases and not the underlying 
rules, the content and application of which appear to be or to have become generally 
accepted and beyond dispute.
This is also true of many general principles of insurance law. Thus, it is trite that 
property insurance is indemnity insurance, that the insured may claim from the 
insurer no more than an indemnity for his loss or damage, and that the extent (or, 
in insurance-speak, the measure) of this indemnity is determined by law or, more 
usually, by the parties’ agreement.
Yet, in South African law there is little, and rather dated, judicial authority for 
these principles (see the observations in Nafte v Atlas Assurance Co Ltd 1924 WLD 
239 245-246, which may in any event have been obiter). Any decision in which an 
opportunity arises to revisit and restate them is therefore of moment and worthy of 
comment. Homeplus Investments (Pvt) Ltd v Kantharia Insurance Brokers (Pvt) Ltd 
case no hh 15-2008 (hc Zim) (unreported) was such a decision (references are to 
the page numbers of the transcript of the judgment).
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